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John Henry Wigmore, writing in the 1930s, was optimistic 
that the courts would embrace something like a perfect memory-
detection device to “detect specifically the memory-failure and the 
lie on the witness-stand.”2 Nearly 100 years of scientific 
advancement later, it is worth asking: What would it really mean 
to be able to detect the contents of a person’s memory? If a brain-
based approach were scientifically reliable, would it be admitted 
as courtroom evidence? Recent advances in brain imaging 
analysis techniques introduce the potential for brain-based 
memory detection and offer new information about the nature of 
autobiographical memory.  
Admissibility in court and the persuasiveness (or prejudicial 
effect) of evidence is often the focus of legal analysis of the new 
neuroscience technology.3 But the deeper question that this 
research presents is this: if the science is sophisticated enough to 
demonstrate that accurate, veridical memory detection is limited 
by biological, rather than technological, constraints, what should 
that understanding mean for broader legal conceptions of how 
memory is traditionally assessed and relied upon in legal 
proceedings? The use of powerful machine-learning algorithms 
reveals the limits of technological capacities to detect true 
memories and affirms existing psychological understanding that 




1 Excerpted and adapted from Emily R.D. Murphy & Jesse Rissman, 
Evidence of Memory from Brain Data, J.L. & BIOSCI. (2020).  
2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1935).  
3 See, e.g., Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner 
Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal 
Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119 (2010); Lyn M. 
Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging Evidence 
in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577 (2016). 
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Technological Advancements, Biological Limits 
 
Memory detection is distinct from lie detection, or “truth 
verification.”4 The existence (or absence) of a memory trace could 
theoretically be detected regardless of whether the subject is 
affirmatively misrepresenting or concealing that information.5 
The forensic appeal of memory detection is based on the 
assumption that certain brain activity is less subject to fabrication, 
reinterpretation, or concealment than subjective reports or even 
than physiological measurements of the body such as skin 
conductance, heart rate, breathing rate, and eye movements. This 
assumption has been tested by assessing the efficacy of 
countermeasures—behavioral or cognitive strategies for “beating 
the test” or manipulating results.  
But active countermeasures are not the only form of potential 
distortion; others come from the innate imperfections of human 
memory. Normal people experience spontaneous memory errors 
(such as déjà vu) as well as imagined or suggested memory errors 
(sometimes called “source confusions”).6 Exactly how, and how 
well, the brain distinguishes autobiographical memories from 
other memories is unclear. Recent research suggests that the 
degree of autobiographical content may make episodic memories 
neurobiologically distinguishable.7 Thus, some consider the 
problem of accurate forensic memory detection to be one of 
technological limitations. But the limitations on memory detection 
 
4 See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: 
The Urgent Need for Regulation, AM. J.L. MED. 377 (2007).  
5 Daniel V. Meegan, Neuroimaging Techniques for Memory Detection: 
Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 9 (2008). 
6 See Ira E. Hyman Jr. & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Errors in Autobiographical 
Memory, 18 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 933, 933–94 (1998); Elizabeth F. 
Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and Memory: The 
Creation of New Memories, 118 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. 100 (1989).  
7 Hung-Yu Chen, Adrian W. Wilmore, Steven M. Nelson & Kathleen B. 
McDemott, Are There Multiple Kinds of Episodic Memory? An fMRI 
Investigation Comparing Autobiographical and Recognition Memory 
Tasks, 37 J. NEUROSCI. 2764 (2017); see also Tiffany E. Chow, Andrew 
J. Westphal & Jesse Rissman, Multi-voxel Pattern Classification 
Differentiates Personally Experienced Event Memories from 
Secondhand Event Knowledge, 176 NEUROIMAGE 110 (2018). 
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may be biological as well. That is, some limitations on memory 
detection may come from the nature of memory itself. 
Techniques based on electroencephalography (EEG) can 
detect some memories with accuracy exceeding 90%. These 
techniques measure brain activity as a subject is presented with a 
series of stimuli—typically words, pictures, or sounds. The EEG 
can detect the subject brain’s differentiated responses to 
unrecognized, recognized, or meaningful stimuli.8 Not all 
information is equally well-remembered, however. People often 
remember very little about incidental details of real-world 
experiences.9 Is this a problem that can be addressed with 
technical advances? Or will those advancements simply reveal the 
outer bounds of what our memory is capable of?  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) images brain 
function. Unlike EEG, fMRI can provide data from the entire 
brain, which is useful because memories are encoded and stored 
in networks of brain regions. Advanced fMRI studies of memory 
detection assess complex network connections and use machine-
learning algorithms to recognize subtle patterns in brain 
networks.10 One of the algorithms successfully classified the 
self/other status of a picture from daily life events 91% of the time 
on average—only by looking at the brain data of a person viewing 
the picture.11 But, in a study of memory for previously seen or new 
faces, while the algorithm proved to be very good at decoding a 
participant’s subjective memory state, it was not nearly as good at 
 
8 See J. Peter Rosenfeld, P300 in Detecting Concealed Information, in 
MEMORY DETECTION: THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEALED 
INFORMATION TEST 63–64 (Bruno Verschuere, Gershon Ben-Shakhar & 
Ewout Meijer eds. 2011).  
9 Pranav Misra, Alyssa Marconi, Matthew Peterson & Gabriel Kreiman, 
Minimal Memory for Details in Real Life Events, 8 SCI. REP., Article 
16,701 (2018). 
10 Jesse Rissman, Tiffany E. Chow, Nicco Reggente & Anthony D. 
Wagner, Decoding fMRI Signatures of Real-world Autobiographical 
Memory Retrieval, 28 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 604, 606–07 (2016) 
[hereinafter “Rissman, Decoding”]; Jesse Rissman, Henry T. Greely & 
Anthony D. Wagner, Detecting Individual Memories Through the 
Neural Decoding of Memory States and Past Experience, 107 
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9849, 9852 (2010) [hereinafter 
“Rissman, Detecting”]. 
11 Rissman et al., Decoding, supra note 10, at 606–07. 
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detecting the participant’s objective experiential history.12 In 
another study, the algorithm could not tell whether the presence 
of crime-related memories had been obtained by way of crime 
execution, crime planning, or reading about the crime-relevant 
details.13 
In short, the biological limitations of memory detection may 
be unsurmountable. Even with sophisticated technology able to 
detect different types of autobiographical or episodic memory 
processes, there may be no way for scanners and algorithms to 
distinguish between an objectively false but subjectively believed 
memory, or distinguish between someone who has knowledge of, 
but did not participate in, a particular event. Those limitations may 




For lawyers and judges, courtroom admissibility is the sine 
qua non for forensic applications of memory-detection 
technology.14 Some have argued that brain-based memory-
detection technologies are not “lie detection” and should not be 
painted with the same brush of unreliability and thus 
inadmissibility.15 But “admissibility” is not an inherent quality of 
technology, but rather is a complicated legal, factual, and 
scientific question in a particular case.  
In court, the admissibility of evidence depends upon, among 
other things, whether it is relevant to the factual issues presented 
in the case. Brain-based memory detection can potentially 
determine which memories are autobiographical. It may detect 
memories that help prove identity. So memory-detection evidence 
may be relevant to establish what happened or who did what. But 
 
12 Rissman et al., Detecting, supra note 10, at 9852–53. 
13 Judith Peth, Tobias Sommer, Martin N. Hebart & Gerhard Vossel, 
Memory Detection using fMRI—Does the Encoding Context Matter? 113 
NEUROIMAGE 164, 165–66 (2015). 
14 See, e.g., John B. Meixner, Jr., Admissibility and Constitutional Issues 
of the Concealed Information Test in American Courts: An Update, in 
DETECTING CONCEALED INFORMATION AND DECEPTION 405, 406 (J. 
Peter Rosenfeld ed. 2018).  
15 See John Meixner, Jr., Liar Liar: Jury’s the Trier? The Future of 
Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment in the Court, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1451, 1474–75 (2012).  
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brain-based technologies cannot, at present, detect past intent or 
past mental state.16 Thus, memory-detection evidence is probably 
not admissible to prove or disprove mental state and intent, which 
are frequently disputed in court. 
In terms of mechanics, in the federal system and many states, 
the Daubert trilogy of cases and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (or 
state analogs) govern the method by which judges must determine 
the admissibility of an expert’s testimony. Presently, courts and 
commentators agree that brain-based deception-detection 
techniques fail to meet the Daubert standard because of their lack 
of understood error rates.17 Some commentators nevertheless 
argue that tests that detect recognition require a “radically” 
different analysis under Daubert.18 This is analytically incorrect. 
Like deception detection, the forensic application of memory-
detection methods has unknown error rates and lacks “general 
acceptance” in the scientific community.19 Moreover, both 
deception detection and recognition detection are fundamentally 
assessments of witness credibility, as discussed below. 
Accordingly, the evidentiary standards should, at present, 
continue to exclude expert testimony opining that brain-based 
memory detection proves the presence or absence of a particular 
memory.  
Even if scientific acceptance grows, reliability still will vary 
across types of memory being assessed. Memory detection will 
work best in situations where a subject has a repeated experience 
resulting in a sturdy, non-fragile memory. Base rates in memory 
inaccuracies will depend upon the type of memory and the 
circumstances of its encoding and retrieval. For example, even just 
“imagining an event that might have occurred in someone’s past 
can increase confidence or believe that the event actually 
occurred, lead individuals to claim that they performed actions 
 
16 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 3.  
17 See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using 
Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy 
Collide, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, L. 222, 231 (2012); United States v. 
Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012); Mem. Op. & Order at 5–6, 
Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C (Md. Sup. Ct. Oct. 3, 2012); Wilson v. 
Corestaff Servs., L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
18 Meixner, supra note 15.  
19 Chow et al., supra note 7, at 122. 
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that they in fact only imagined or result in the production of 
specific and detailed false memories of events that never actually 
happened.”20 Normal people, describing non-traumatic life events 
over successive interviews, show high degrees of variability in 
their autobiographical memory.21 The relevant base rates—i.e., 
how often false or inaccurate memories happen in day-to-day 
life—are unknown. 
The admissibility of brain-based memory detection may be 
relaxed if introduced by a criminal defendant. Because criminal 
defendants have a constitutional right to compulsory process, to 
which evidentiary rules must sometimes yield,22 a defendant may 
be able to admit brain-based memory-detection evidence that is 
less reliable than what the prosecution would be able to put 
forward. The Constitution may impose other potential hurdles on 
the prosecution. Whether the output of a memory-detection device 
is physical evidence or testimonial evidence for purposes of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments remains unresolved.23 A defendant 
could, for example, raise a Confrontation Clause challenge to 
memory-detection evidence of a state witness unavailable for 
cross-examination at trial. 
 
Memory Detection as Credibility Assessment 
 
Even were brain-based memory-detection evidence admitted 
into trial evidence, the jury would have to assign weight to the 
evidence, which is fundamentally a measure of the witness’s 
 
20 Daniel L. Schacter & Elizabeth Loftus, Memory and Law: What Can 
Cognitive Neuroscience Contribute?, 16 NATURE NEUROSCI. 119, 121 
(2013); Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E.L. Stark, The Neuroscience of 
Memory: Implications for the Courtroom, 14 NATURE 649 (2013). 
21 Stephen J. Anderson, Gillian Cohen & Stephanie Taylor, Rewriting 
the Past: Some Factors Affecting the Variability of Personal Memories, 
14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 435 (2000). 
22 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284 (1973).  
23 See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind Reading, 15 
YALE J. L. & TECH. 214, 218 (2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating 
Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012); Matthew B. Holloway, Note, 
One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words: Images of Brain 
Activity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. 
TECH. & ENVL. L. 141, 144 (2008).  
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credibility. Credibility assessment, in the context of evidence law, 
means assessing how worthy evidence is of being believed.24 
Lying and insincerity are obvious factors, but witness credibility 
also includes other testimonial capacities of ambiguity, memory 
loss, and misperception.25 Brain-based memory detection 
admitted in court via an expert witness should be double-
credibility dependent. That is, the jury must assess the credibility 
of the memory itself (that is, witness credibility), and the 
credibility of the memory-detection technology (such as imprecise 
or ambiguous outputs, incorrect inferences, and any biases of the 
expert testifying). 26 This “double credibility” analysis is not 
sufficiently scrutinized by existing Daubert and Frye reliability 
requirements for expert methods.27 
The key point is that, depending upon the situation at hand, 
brain-based memory detection may offer little to no probative 
value in assessing the accuracy of a witness’s memory. If 
memory-detection technology cannot reliably distinguish false 
from true memories, then its evidentiary value is limited to 
bolstering or undermining witness sincerity—and it is subject to 
the same objections as lie-detector tests of impermissibly 
impinging upon the role of the jury.28 That is, in many applied 
contexts, memory detection is probably indistinguishable from lie 
detection—and thus is subject to the same objections regarding 
the role of the jury as the ultimate assessor of credibility. The most 
advanced scientific and technological work in memory detection 
presently suggests that no machine, no matter how sophisticated, 
could detect a false but subjectively believed memory. But the use 
of brain-based technology and sophisticated machine-learning 
algorithms may obscure that fact with the veneer of factual 
accuracy. The technological and biological complexity of 
sophisticated brain-based memory detection makes it exceedingly 
 
24 Credibility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defined as 
“worthiness of belief”).  
25 See, e.g., Edmund Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of 
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948). 
26 Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1979 (2017).  
27 Id. at 2035. 
28 George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 
(1997). 
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difficult—perhaps impossible—for mere laypersons to assess 
whether, and how much, they should ultimately believe it as fact. 
 
If We Could, Should We? 
 
If we had a “perfect” brain-based memory detector, should we 
use it? Decisional accuracy is undoubtedly a crucial value for the 
jury system, but “soft” systemic values of “dignity, equity, and 
mercy” also play a role.29 As Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme 
Court once wrote: “I doubt that the uneasiness about electrical lie 
detectors would disappear even if they were refined to place their 
accuracy beyond question. Indeed, I would not be surprised if such 
a development would only heighten the sense of unease and the 
search for plausible legal objections.”30 Accurate fact 
determination may be the dominant value in assessing evidence 
that can go to the jury,31 but it is not so dominant to entirely set 
aside personhood issues, particularly when biological limitations 
may prevent even perfect technology from revealing the truth. 
The fundamental value of personhood—as opposed to the 
reductionist, objectified readout of one’s brain—is a cornerstone 
of procedural justice.32 Personhood values apply not only to 
witnesses, but to jurors, in their ability to appreciate the 
personhood of a witness whose credibility they must assess.33 
Personhood is central to witness credibility, as evidenced by the 
history of witness-competency rules and existing doctrine of 
impeachment.34 The dark side of the history of credibility 
assessment is that social and behavioral status has long been, and 
still is in character-based impeachment doctrine, 35 a proxy for 
 
29 Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO L.J. 1245, 1282–90 (2016). 
30 State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 238 (Or. 1987) (Linde, J., concurring).  
31 James R. McCall, The Personhood Argument Against Polygraph 
Evidence, Or “Even If the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit 
the Results?,” 49 HASTINGS L.J. 925, 942 (1998). 
32 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (revised ed. 2006).  
33 Cf. McCall, supra note 31, at 943.  
34 Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 
161–66 (2017). 
35 See id. at 186 (noting that the “link between credibility, reputation, and 
criminality drawn in today’s impeachment rules thus continues to reflect 
the notion that the indicia of being a bad person, however defined, is also 
the indicia of a liar”).  
Vol. 5 The Judges’ Book 75 
who is worthy of belief, with disproportionate effects on persons 
of color and communities without privilege.36 The urge to replace 
these troublesome status-based credibility assessments with 
reliable and objective lie-detection science is justifiable.37 But if 
science-based techniques can only identify subjective 
experience—filtered through the impressions and decisions of 
whoever is probing the witness’s brain—are we really any closer 
to establishing objective truth? Or are we now assessing witness 





Courtroom admissibility is a misdirected pursuit of memory-
detection technology. At present, its admissibility would be 
precluded under Daubert, Frye, or state equivalents, primarily for 
lack of known error rates and lack of general acceptance in the 
relevant scientific communities. But were it to clear these hurdles, 
brain-based memory detection may still not be suitable for 
courtroom use. The most advanced brain-based memory-detection 
studies suggest that only subjective experiences, rather than 
objective truths, may be accessible, rendering memory detection 
generally on the same footing as sincerity detection. Further, the 
method of acquiring that information requires machine-learning 
algorithms that may be opaque or even unexplainable to a jury, 
hindering their ability to assess the machine’s (and expert’s) 
credibility and assign appropriate weight. And even if the perfect 
memory-detection device worked perfectly well, its use as 
evidence would risk marginalizing the personhood of witnesses 
and thus undermining procedural justice. 
  
 
36 Id. at 189–91.  
37 Id. at 158. 
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